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The Commercial Paper Market, the Fed, and the
2007-2009 Financial Crisis
Richard G. Anderson and Charles S. Gascon
Since its inception in the early nineteenth century, the U.S. commercial paper market has grown
to become a key source of short-term funding for major businesses, with issuance averaging over
$100 billion per day. In the fall of 2008, the commercial paper market achieved national prominence
when increasing market stress caused some to fear that, given its size and importance, the market’s
failure would sharply worsen the recession. The Department of the Treasury and Federal Reserve
enacted programs targeted at providing credit and liquidity to restore investor confidence. The
authors review the history of the commercial paper market, describe its structure and key relation-
ships to money market mutual funds, and present a detailed discussion of the crisis in the market,
including the resulting Federal Reserve programs. (JEL G01, G24, E52)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2009, 91(6), pp. 589-612.
The early years of the CP market were domi-
nated by issuers in the nonfinancial sectors of
the economy, including transportation and util-
ity companies, who borrowed by issuing CP to
wealthy individuals, other businesses, and
financial institutions. By the twentieth century,
as the demand for durable goods rose and con-
sumers began purchasing items on credit, the CP
market became dominated by financial issuers.
The rise of MMMFs during the 1970s boosted
the growth of CP by (indirectly) allowing small
investors access to CP investments. During the
1980s, the CP market began to develop into its
current form, particularly with the creation of the
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduit.
During the autumn of 2008, some feared that
stress on—and potential failure of—the CP market
F
or both small and large American busi-
nesses, commercial paper (CP) issuance
is an important—and often lower-cost—
alternative to bank loans as a means of
short-term financing. Paper is sold in different
forms: Some paper is sold unsecured (that is,
without specific collateral), while other paper is
secured by bank-issued letters of credit or pools
of assets, including a firm’s receivables. The funds
raised through CP issuance have a variety of uses,
including payroll and inventory finance.
CP is important for investors as well. Larger
investors, including institutions, directly pur-
chase CP as a short-term, low-risk investment.
For smaller investors, money market mutual
funds (MMMFs) intermediate between larger-
denomination CP and the liquid, smaller-
denomination shares that they issue to the public.1
Since the inception of the CP market in the
early nineteenth century, it has grown such that
today CP issuance exceeds that of Treasury bills.
1 MMMFs purchase low-risk, large-denomination securities such
as commercial paper and government securities, and issue “shares”
at $1 per share.
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the Treasury and Federal Reserve enacted pro-
grams to restore stability. These programs focused
on enhancing market liquidity, not on removing
default risk from the market.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET
In its traditional form, CP is an unsecured
promissory note issued by a business (either finan-
cial or nonfinancial) for a specific dollar amount
and with maturity on a specific date.2 Companies
issue CP as a low-cost alternative to bank loans,
as it is exempt from Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registration.3 CP is generally
issued in large denominations of ($100,000 or
more). The maturity on CP averages 30 days but
may range up to 270 days. Proceeds from CP
issuance are used to finance “current transac-
tions,” including meeting payroll obligations, and
funding current assets, such as managing receiv-
ables or inventories. Figure 1 displays the maturity
composition of CP issued in 2008; that year, the
majority of CP had a maturity of less than 1 week.
Similar to Treasury bills, CP is typically issued
at a discount, meaning that the buyer pays less
than face value and receives face value at maturity:
The “interest” is equal to the face value minus
the purchase price. Although CP is issued at short
maturities to minimize interest expense, many
issuers roll over CP by selling new paper to pay
off maturing paper. Because of modest credit risk,
yields on CP are slightly higher than on Treasury
bills of similar maturity. Large denominations and
short maturities typically limit the CP market to
large institutional investors, such as MMMFs.
CP generally is classified in three broad (but
overlapping) categories: nonfinancial, financial,
and asset-backed. Further, CP may be classified
as being sold with the assistance of a CP dealer
(dealer placed) or without (directly placed).
Traditional nonfinancial and financial paper,
respectively, are unsecured short-term debt issued
by highly rated corporations, including industrial
firms, public utilities, bank holding companies,
and consumer finance corporations. ABCP, on the
other hand, is more complicated. The simplest
description of ABCP is as a form of securitization:
As the name implies, it is CP with specific assets
attached. In financial industry jargon, ABCP is
issued by “conduits.” Conduits are structured to
be bankruptcy remote and limited in purpose.4
Each conduit includes a special-purpose vehicle
(SPV) that is the legal entity at the center of the
program and a financial adviser (usually a com-
mercial or investment bank) that manages the pro-
gram and determines the assets to be purchased
Anderson and Gascon
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2 The exception being ABCP, which is CP with specific assets attached
as collateral. We discuss this type of CP in more detail below.
3 CP is exempt from SEC registration if the following three criteria
are met: (i) the maturity of the paper is less than 270 days, (ii) notes
must be of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public,





















Commercial Paper Issuance by Maturity,
2008 (average, $ billions)
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Volume Statistics for
Commercial Paper Issuance.
4 Bankruptcy remote refers to all participants in a conduit agreeing
not to force the SPV into bankruptcy prior to a year and a day after
issuance of the conduit’s most recent CP; this ensures redemption
of all CP. Limited purpose refers to issuance of CP as its sole
business.and the ABCP paper to be issued. The owner of
the conduit receives nominal dividend payments;
and because the SPV does not generally have any
employees, fees are paid to an administrator (nor-
mally a bank) to manage the flow of CP and funds. 
To investors, ABCP programs are less trans-
parent than traditional unsecured corporate CP—
the SPV is an opaque entity that holds assets that
are unknown to the purchaser of the ABCP. Perfor  -
m  ance of the ABCP depends on the skill of the
bank adviser, which essentially is saying to ABCP
purchasers: “Trust us with your funds and we will
invest them for you.” The degree of disclosure in
the market varies widely. Some multiseller5 con-
duits provide investors with at least a list of assets,
liquidity enhancements, and performance history,
whereas other more-complex conduits provide
very limited disclosure. During normal times,
yields on ABCP have been approximately 75 basis
points greater than yields on traditional unsecured
CP.6 This spread is a continued mystery with
numerous explanations: Why should CP with
assets attached as collateral pay a higher yield
than CP with no such collateral? Some have sug-
gested this spread exists because ABCP is (indi-
rectly) being issued by firms unable to directly
issue their own CP. However, this does not explain
why ABCP issued by a conduit sponsored (and
insured) by a bank would have a higher yield than
CP directly issued by the same bank lacking any
collateral. Moody’s (2009) attributes the yield
premium specifically to the lack of transparency,
noting that traditional CP is relatively easily under-
stood, while ABCP is issued by an unfamiliar SPV
with assets from anonymous sellers.
Because of its role in the 2008 credit crisis,
some additional discussion of ABCP is valuable.
CP conduits, in their structure, are classic finan-
cial intermediaries: They purchase one or more
types of financial assets and issue ABCP in their
Anderson and Gascon
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5 A bank-sponsored multiseller conduit backs its CP with a diverse
pool of assets, as opposed to a single-seller conduit (e.g., a conduit
sponsored by General Motors Acceptance Corporation), which
backs its CP with pools of specific assets (e.g., auto loans).
Table 1
Asset Composition of Multiseller Conduits (approx.)
2002 2006 2007 2008
Consumer Assets
Credit Card Receivables 41.9 44.2 44.4 45.9
Auto Loans and Leases 12.3 13.8 16.0 17.8
Credit Cards 14.9 10.5 13.1 12.7
Student Loans 1.0 4.2 7.2 8.5
Residential Mortgages 8.2 11.3 4.8 4.4
Other Consumer 5.5 4.3 3.1 2.4
Commercial Assets 51.5 43.3 54.8 44.0
Trade Receivables 14.6 15.4 13.9 14.0
Commercial Loans and Leases 6.6 12.4 13.6 12.9
Equipment Loans and Leases 10.6 3.4 3.6 4.1
Other Commercial 19.6 12.1 14.7 13.0
Securities 6.6 12.5 9.7 10.1
Total (percent) 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: Moody’s ABCP Query: Data are the share of total outstanding as of year-end.
6 This spread can be calculated using rates on AA-rated CP reported
in the Federal Reserve Board volume statistics on CP issuance. The
spread changes depending on the issue type (financial or nonfinan-
cial) and maturity chosen.own name. Their business purpose is to arbitrage
risk and rate spreads between the assets they pur-
chase and the liabilities they issue. ABCP conduits
come in many types. The largest type is multi-
seller conduits. The major cost to a multiseller
ABCP conduit is the insurance of risk. To insure
risk, conduits pay fees to a liquidity provider
(rollover risk) and a credit-enhancement provider
(default risk).
ABCP issued by multiseller conduits is often
used to finance the purchase of consumer and
commercial assets (Table 1). A firm that sells
receivables to a conduit frees its own funds and
reduces its need to borrow. Large, creditworthy
firms typically sell their paper directly to investors
via an agent or dealer, a practice referred to as a
“single-seller conduit.” Smaller firms, however,
find this method costly, and prefer to operate via
a multiseller ABCP conduit in which the firm
sells its debts to a bank-advised SPV which, in
turn, sells ABCP to investors. Large firms may also
use multiseller ABCP conduits as an additional
source of liquidity in cases when they have a quick
turnaround on trade receivables that are not large
enough to warrant “traditional” CP issuance.
Unrated firms may also lower borrowing costs
Anderson and Gascon













































ABCP Conduits—Banking Without a Bank
NOTE: *See Figure 3 for additional details.via multiseller conduits by paying a spread to
the conduit sponsor.
Figures 2 and 3 outline the securitization of
assets through a multiseller ABCP conduit. At the
top of the diagram are debtors (i.e., individuals
or businesses) who borrow money from sellers
(i.e., mortgage lenders or banks). In the center of
Figure 2 is the ABCP conduit; its SPV is illustrated
in Figure 3. The ABCP SPV purchases, from the
sellers, the debt at some price less than face value.
This overcollateralization (or “haircut”) provides
an equity cushion to CP investors. Because finding
suitable investors may be costly, the ABCP SPV
has a relationship with a dealer (i.e., an invest-
ment bank), who suggests a price and finds suit-
able investors.
Because the maturity on the CP is shorter than
the maturity on the original loans, the ABCP
conduit will roll over the maturing CP to pay
investors. As with any CP program, rating agen-
cies require ABCP conduits to obtain liquidity
backstops on each transaction to assume much
of the rollover risk. Liquidity providers will nor-
mally provide funds on non-defaulted assets.
Because there is always a risk that some debtors
fail to make payments, investors require additional
program-wide credit enhancements, generally in
the form of a bank letter of credit or insurance
company surety bond on some fraction of the
maximum program size.7 Normally, these agree-
ments require payment by the provider once other
sources of funds have been exhausted. In many
cases the administrator is the same bank provid-
ing the liquidity and credit enhancements. As a
result, the credit rating of the conduit is closely
related to the credit rating of liquidity and credit
providers, as well as the reputation of the manag-
ing party.
Table 2 shows the composition of CP outstand-
ing by issuer and placement type. The top two
rows report the average amount outstanding in
2001 and 2008, and the bottom two rows report
shares as a percentage of the total. For each issuer,
the average amount outstanding is disaggregated
by the placement type. For example, during 2001,
financial CP outstanding averaged $617.0 billion
(41.4 percent of the total), of which $336.5 billion
was placed by dealers (22.6 percent of the total)
and $280.6 billion was directly placed (18.8 per-
cent of total). On average, 90 percent of outstand-
ing CP was either ABCP or financial CP in 2008. 
A firm ordinarily requires a dealer to place its
paper if it lacks the name recognition necessary
Anderson and Gascon
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7 This really applies only to bank-sponsored multiseller programs.
Securities arbitrage programs have recently added letters of credit,
while structured investment vehicles use overcollateralization






























SOURCE: Adapted from Moody’s (2003).to attract investors or if its funding requirements
either are too limited or infrequent to warrant
building its own distribution system. Direct issuers
of CP, most of them traditional issuers, borrow in
sufficient size and frequency that the costs of
developing an in-house distribution system are
less than the costs of placing paper through a
dealer. For nonbanks, an in-house system may
become profitable if CP issuance reaches $500
million or more. Mostly the major finance com-
panies and large banking organizations that also
distribute wholesale liabilities (such as certifi-
cates of deposit [CDs]) place their paper directly.
Only a few nonfinancial firms are direct issuers
of paper.
Many companies build close relationships
with their dealers: If a company is willing to sell
its paper at the dealer’s suggested price, the dealer
will agree to purchase unsold paper. Yet, relation-
ships with dealers may be problematic and are not
explicitly guaranteed. Market intelligence suggests
that dealer relationships for multiseller conduits
were “strained to the breaking point” during the
fall of 2007, and “collapsed” for many single-
seller and securities arbitrage conduits. Generally,
according to dealer reports in Stigum and Crezcenzi
(2007), “competition among dealers is fierce...at
a 70 percent utilization rate you maybe break even
or are losing a bit of money...[at a] 90 percent
utilization rate you begin to make real profits.”
Dealers charge clients a fee that is less than one-
eighth of 1 percentage point, which in 2008,
translated into roughly $150 million in daily
fees on $120 billion of CP issued daily.8
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET
In the early years of the CP market, the nine-
teenth century, nonfinancial firms (including
textile mills and railroad companies) were the
major issuers of paper. By the early twentieth
century, particularly following the founding of
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC)
in 1919, the CP market expanded to include finan-
cial paper. After World War II, increased sales of
durable goods on credit (especially televisions
and automobiles) encouraged expansion of con-
sumer finance companies and, in turn, the CP mar-
ket (Stigum and Crezcenzi, 2007, Chap 3). Later,
even for business purposes such as financing
inventory and raising cash for current operating
expenses, CP increasingly replaced bankers’
acceptances as the instrument of choice for short-
term financing.
Figure 4 shows the trend in the amount of CP
outstanding (all issue types) since 1952. Prior to
2000, the CP market grew steadily as both borrow-
8 Data on daily issuance of dealer paper are not available; the cal-
culation assumes 80 percent (the percentage of total outstanding
issued by dealers) of the average daily issuance is placed by dealers.
The dealer fee of 0.0125 percent is from Stigum and Crezcenzi
(2007, p. 989).
Anderson and Gascon
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Table 2
Commercial Paper Outstanding by Issuer and Placement
Financial Nonfinancial Asset-backed All types
Dealer Directly Total Dealer Directly Total Dealer Directly Total Total
Total (average), $ billions
2001 336.5 280.6 617.0 205.9 38.5 244.4 500.8 127.6 628.4 1489.8
2008 552.2 231.5 783.7 174.6 17.1 191.7 663.1 100.4 763.6 1739.3
Share (percent)
2006 22.6 18.8 41.4 13.8 2.6 16.4 33.6 8.6 42.2 100.0
2008 31.7 13.3 45.1 10.0 1.0 11.0 38.1 5.8 43.9 100.0
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Volume Statistics for Commercial Paper Issuance.Anderson and Gascon
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Figure 4
Quarterly Commercial Paper Outstanding (1952-1986 and 1987-2009)
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds, Table L.208.ers and investors shifted into CP from alternative
money market instruments, including Treasury
bills, bankers’ acceptances, and CDs.9 The down-
turn that took place in the 2000 is discussed further
below. In 1970, CP comprised only one-quarter of
the dollar volume of outstanding money market
instruments; in 2006, it comprised two-thirds
(Stigum and Crezcenzi, 2007, p. 967).
The introduction of MMMFs in 1971 had a
large and long-lasting impact on the CP market.
Fueled initially by rising demand for consumer
durables, growth of the CP market was ignited in
the 1970s by widespread investor enthusiasm
for MMMFs. For savers and investors, MMMF
shares were an attractive alternative to bank
deposits; for corporate borrowers, CP was an
attractive alternative to bank loans. Assets of
MMMFs increased sixfold between 1980 and the
end of 1991 (Table 3). During the period spanning
1972-92, MMMFs on average held 18.2 percent
of all outstanding CP; in 2008, it was almost 40
percent. The increase in MMMF holdings was not
steady: During three years (1978-81), the share of
CP held by MMMFs soared to 32 percent from less
than 1 percent, subsequently remaining near 30
percent. At year-end 1991, the MMMF industry
held about one-third of all CP outstanding and
was the largest single investor. Holdings of CP
by foreign investors, on the other hand, have
increased gradually since the early 1990s. (In
Table 3, the share held by funding corporations
Anderson and Gascon
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Table 3
Major Holders of Commercial Paper*
Percent $ Billions
1952-1971 1972-1991 1992-present 2008 2008
Money Market Mutual Funds — 18.2 34.7 38.5 615.6
Funding Corporations 3.3 11.5 12.9 23.0 367.5
Foreign Sector 15.6 4.6 9.5 14.6 233.2
State & Local Governments ——8.1 7.7 123.8
Security Brokers & Dealers — 4.7 3.0 4.1 65.7
Mutual Funds 3.3 2.6 5.7 3.3 52.0
Life Insurance Companies 2.2 7.5 5.2 2.7 42.8
Private Pension Funds — 8.2 2.8 2.3 36.9
State & Local Gov. Retirement Funds — 0.8 3.2 2.0 31.9
Commercial Banking 18.4 7.5 0.4 0.9 15.0
Nonprofit Organizations 42.7 23.3 8.2 0.7 10.4
Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business 14.0 9.0 4.0 0.3 4.7
Monetary Authority 0.5 ——— 0.0
Savings Institutions — 1.2 —— —
Credit Unions — 0.1 0.1 ——
GSEs — 0.6 2.1 ——
Total (percent) 100.0 99.7 100.0 100.0
Total ($ billions) 13.3 262.9 1,234.4 1,599.5  1,599.5
NOTE: *Data reported are for open market paper, which contains both CP and bankers acceptances. CP comprises 85 percent of
open market paper over the sample and 99 percent since 1998.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds, Table L.208.
9 See Anderson (2009a,b) for a discussion of bankers’ acceptances.
Today, the bankers’ acceptance market is moribund, overtaken by CP. is the residual, holdings not accounted for by the
other categories.)10
Problems in the Early Years: 
The Penn Central Collapse
Penn Central railroad was a major issuer of
CP, with approximately $84 million outstanding
in the summer of 1970. As the company’s cash
flows dwindled, debt holders pushed for govern-
ment assistance that would have allowed Penn
Central to repay maturing CP. The assistance plan
failed, and on June 21, 1970, Penn Central filed
for bankruptcy (Calomiris, 1994). The bankruptcy
of Penn Central rattled the CP market. The econ-
omy was already in recession, and the financial
health of the company had apparently deteriorated
in a matter of months. Market participants became
worried that other highly rated CP issuers could
be in a similar position.
In the years before the collapse, the CP market
had experienced rapid growth and appeared to
be isolated from economic downturns. Figure 5
indicates that total CP outstanding did not decline
during either of the prior recessions. Because the
market had not previously experienced such
stress, lenders were uncertain of potential spill  -
over effects of the bankruptcy, including the
inability to roll over existing paper at maturity.
The unwillingness of the Congress and the Federal
Reserve to ensure payment of Penn Central’s debt
left creditors facing substantial losses. In response
to the crisis, the Fed encouraged member banks
to borrow at the discount window and make loans
to CP issuers.11 According to reports at the time,
Anderson and Gascon
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11 See Calmoris (1994) for additional details. 
10 Funding corporations consist of four types of financial institutions
and entities: (i) subsidiaries of foreign banks that raise funds in
U.S. markets and transfer proceeds to foreign banking offices in
the United States; (ii) subsidiaries of foreign banks and nonbank
financial firms that raise funds in the United States and transfer
them to a parent company abroad; (iii) nonbank financial holding
companies; and (iv) custodial accounts for reinvested collateral

















Monthly Commercial Paper Outstanding (1953-1974)
SOURCE: Board of Governors (1976) and Federal Reserve Board, Commercial Paper Statistics.discount window borrowing to finance CP roll  -
overs reached $500 million in the weeks follow-
ing the collapse. The actions of the Fed assured
financial markets that the liquidity needed to
meet obligations would be available. Nevertheless,
outstanding CP declined by 21 percent during
subsequent quarters before turning upward in
the second quarter of 1972. Eventually, the market
regained its confidence—CP grew steadily for
the next three decades. However, after the crisis
CP issuers were more reserved and began secur-
ing lines of credit in case of market disruptions.
The Adolescence of the U.S. Commercial
Paper Market: 1980-199212
The U.S. CP market matured during the 1980s.
At the beginning of the decade, issuance was
primarily by a small number of large, prominent,
and creditworthy companies. During the decade,
everything changed. The market’s size grew five-
fold. New issuers and dealers arrived, while some
older issuers disappeared. New forms of paper
were introduced, most importantly ABCP.
In the 1980s, corporate borrowers faced pay-
ing relatively high rates (compared with historical
experience) on both long-term funds (bonds) and
bank loans, owing in part to robust economic
growth. A less costly alternative was issuance of
CP, which grew rapidly. Many new issuers were
attracted to the market, including smaller U.S.
corporations, foreign corporations, and foreign
financial institutions. The development of a mar-
ket in currency swaps allowed foreign borrowers
to combine U.S. dollar-denominated CP issuance
with swaps so as to create liabilities in other cur-
rencies. ABCP also came into general use, provid-
ing off-balance-sheet financing for trade and credit
card receivables. Finally, the growth of MMMFs,
coupled with a shift in the composition of their
investments toward CP, made them the largest
single source of funds to the market (see Table 3).
A series of defaults on CP that began in 1989
caused tighter regulations to be imposed on MMMF
holdings of medium-grade paper. Heightened
investor concerns effectively forced many medium-
quality issuers to cut back sharply on their use of
the CP market. Increasing costs also changed the
role of banks in the CP market. Financial stress
at banks became manifest in the pressure from
markets and regulators to increase their capital
levels, which in turn increased their costs of pro-
viding letters of credit and backup liquidity to
the CP market. Partially offsetting this effect, in
terms of overall CP market volume, were efforts
of banks to increase loan rates and margins on
loans. Growth of the CP market was neither
smooth nor painless. The composition of firms
issuing CP changed as defaults reduced investor
appetite for medium-grade paper. At times, issuers
returned to banks, finding bank loans less expen-
sive than CP.
Defaults of CP are rare. Between 1971 and
mid-1989, no defaults occurred in U.S. CP except
for the litigation-driven default by Manville
Corporation in 1982 (Post, 1992, p. 888). In mid-
1989, the U.S. CP market was hit with three
defaults; four more followed in 1990. Because
fund advisers injected capital to cover the short-
falls, investors incurred no losses. The SEC sub-
sequently tightened Rule 2a-7 to generally require
two ratings on CP held by money funds and to
limit a fund’s holdings of a single firm’s paper
(p. 889).Growth of the paper market slowed there-
after, and some medium-grade issuers found bor-
rowing at banks less expensive.13
The financial markets calmed after 1990 and
were capable of handling the funding needs of
medium-grade firms. Medium-grade issuers
successfully tapped bank lines of credit or their
CP dealers, while ABCP absorbed some of the
needs of these firms and grew rapidly. But
investors remained wary of medium-grade
paper. Interest rates on it spiked again both at
midyear and at year-end 1991 because many
investors did not want to show such holdings
on their published financial statements. The
June 1991 default of Columbia Gas, a second-
tier issuer, renewed concerns about the safety
of medium-grade paper (p. 889).
12 This section is based on Post (1992).
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13 New Basel Accord risk-based capital guidelines for banks, adopted
in 1988, would become effective at year-end, and market partici-
pants grew increasingly uncertain about the capacity of banks to
honor all their loan commitments. As a result, rates paid on CP,
even by highly rated firms, jumped in December 1990. This proved,
however, to be the point of maximum stress.Issuers at the end of the 1980s differed greatly
from those at the beginning. At the end of 1989,
about 1,250 corporations and other entities had
paper programs in the U.S. CP market, 500 more
than in 1980. Many new issuers were foreign firms
and smaller, lesser-known U.S. firms; previously,
CP issuers almost uniformly were large, well-
known U.S. corporations.
The Growth in Dealer-Placed Financial
Paper. Throughout the life of the CP market,
methods of issuance have continued to evolve.
During the 1980s, direct issuers expanded rapidly.
Early in the decade, approximately 60 percent
of all CP was sold directly by issuers to investors
(p. 883). Among the more important issuers were
large finance companies; these grew rapidly after
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 promoted
business use of leasing. 
Bank holding companies continued to use the
CP market to support parent company opera-
tions, including leasing and lending by non-
bank subsidiaries. By the end of the decade,
outstanding paper placed directly by financial
firms surpassed $200 billion, more than triple
the level at the start of the decade…[Yet, even
faster growth was experienced by firms that
used dealers for distribution.]…By 1989,
dealer-placed paper accounted for 60 percent
of all CP outstanding, up sharply from about
40 percent at the start of the decade (p. 883). 
In part, the growth was supported by Federal
Reserve Board rulings in 1986 and 1987 that
authorized certain so-called Section 20 subsidi  -
aries of bank holding companies to deal in CP
to a limited extent; by year-end 1991, these sub-
sidiaries accounted for about 14 percent of out-
standing dealer-placed paper. And by December
1990, dealer-placed financial CP outstanding sur-
passed the amount of directly placed financial
CP (p. 884).
The increased share of dealer-placed paper
also reflected, in part, the changing composition
of issuers: Dealers were required for the aggres-
sive marketing needed to package and sell new
issuers and new types of CP programs. 
During the mid- to late 1980s, the presence of
foreign financial institutions in the U.S. market
grew, and these firms generally required dealer
assistance to promote their names to U.S.
investors. By year-end 1991, these firms had
outstanding CP in excess of $110 billion,
slightly more than half of all dealer-placed
financial paper. Highly rated foreign banks
(or their U.S. subsidiaries) accounted for 55
percent of this paper (pp. 884-85).
The Growth in Guaranteed Paper. The
growth in guaranteed paper is described by Post
(p. 884). 
The share of CP programs that were fully (100
percent) enhanced by credit guarantees—often
bank letters of credit—from highly rated third
parties grew dramatically in the first half of
the decade. In fact, programs with such credit
enhancements accounted for about all the net
increase in the number of CP issuers rated by
Moody’s over that period. Presumably, most of
these programs were small because their out-
standing CP accounted for less than 10 percent
of all outstanding paper.
Because investors in such paper rely on the
guarantor, rather than the issuer, to make pay-
ment in full upon maturity of the paper, the
paper carries the rating of the guarantor.
Whereas traditional issuers entered the market
on the strength of their own credit quality
(or that of their parent), many of the new CP
programs of the first half of the 1980s gained
access to the market on the strength of guaran-
tees by unrelated entities.
Introduction of the Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper Conduit. The decade’s second innovation,
and perhaps its most important, was the intro-
duction of the bank-advised ABCP conduit in
1983.14 The structure of the typical multiseller
ABCP conduits was discussed previously. When
considered solely by their economic functions,
such conduits, essentially, are regarded as “banks
without banking charters.” The motives at the
time of their introduction are well described by
Post (1992, p. 886):
The development of the asset-backed sector
of the CP market arose from several factors.
U.S. banking organizations saw an opportu-
nity to generate fee income from potential
participants in their programs—many of
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that they had lost as loan customers to the CP
market. These banking organizations also
became more familiar with asset securitiza-
tion. This similarity resulted, in part, from
increased market and regulatory pressure to
increase their capital ratios. Asset securitiza-
tion, and asset-backed CP in particular, per-
mitted banks to channel would-be borrowers
to funding off of bank balance sheets.
Another factor was that financial markets
became increasingly familiar with, and thus
more willing to accept, programs that
required structuring, such as those with
credit guarantees. Dealers saw opportunities
to market asset-backed programs to compa-
nies seeking to increase liquidity or to reduce
leverage, regardless of size or rating.
Moreover, they already had proved success-
ful in marketing lower-rated firms to the CP
market via guaranteed programs and realized
that a pool of potential business existed in
companies that were too small to tap the CP
market through their own guaranteed pro-
grams. Thus, banking organizations formed
bank-advised asset-backed programs, relying
on dealers.
ABCP conduits increased in number from 3 in
1985 to 89 by year-end 1991. Between 1990 and
1991, ABCP programs accounted for virtually all
the increase in domestic CP issuers. By year-end
1991, ABCP accounted for about 9 percent of all
outstanding CP.
In circumstances reminiscent of the 2008
credit crisis, credit problems at sponsoring bank
holding companies slowed the growth of ABCP
paper during the 1989-92 credit crisis. Cantor and
Roriques (1994) report that the perceived credit
risk of CP increased as the number of defaults on
CP “soared” (p. 171) and the number or down-
grades outpaced the number of upgrades between
1988 and 1989 (p. 194). ABCP conduit ratings
were downgraded as large loan losses, and the
need to raise capital ratios reduced the ratings of
sponsoring banks. Outstanding CP of bank holding
companies (almost all directly issued) decreased
from a peak of $52 billion in January 1990 to $24
billion at year-end 1991.
The Maturation of Commercial Paper:
1992 to Fall 2007
This era of the CP market is characterized by
the steady decline in the prominence of nonfinan-
cial CP and the continued rise in ABCP. According
to Moody’s (2009), ABCP entered the mainstream
of money market instruments during the mid-
1990s as more institutional investors began to
significantly increase their holdings. The ABCP
market enlarged in the late 1990s when the com-
mercial bank advisers to ABCP conduits discov-
ered arbitrage opportunities in the securitization
of asset-backed securities, residential mortgage-
backed securities, and collateralized debt obliga-
tions. In general, the arbitrage opportunities arose
because the longer-term securities purchased by
ABCP conduits carried yields in excess of the
London Interbank offering rate (LIBOR), while
the conduits could issue short-term (1- to 4-day)
ABCP at rates no higher than LIBOR (Standard &
Poor’s, 2008). Because the rate differential largely
reflects the unhedged term premium and the
uncovered rollover funding risk, success of the
arbitrage depends on the premium not moving
sharply.
The Decline in Nonfinancial Commercial
Paper. Interaction between the CP market and
other types of finance, driven by changes in
respective yields, is illustrated by the decrease
in nonfinancial CP outstanding during the 2000
recession. Beginning in 2000, total nonfinancial
CP outstanding dropped by almost 50 percent
in just over 2 years (Figure 6).
Shen (2003) concludes that “aggressive inven-
tory reduction and the widespread practice of
replacing [CP] with longer term corporate bonds
have reduced the demand for credit in the [CP]
market.” Because nominal rates were relatively
low following the 2000 recession, businesses
elected to reduce uncertainty about future borrow-
ing costs by reducing holdings of CP and issuing
bonds at low interest rates. Subsequent data have
supported Shen’s view. The share of nonfinancial
businesses borrowing through the CP market
declined from 5.4 percent between 1995 and
2000 to 2.3 percent between 2001 and 2008. At
the same time, the share of nonfinancial borrow-
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from 45.9 percent (1995-2000) to 54.4 percent
(2001-08).15
Innovations in Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper. In 2003, additional innovation changed
the internal dynamics of ABCP conduits. Pre  -
viously, typical conduit programs required three
players in supporting roles: the adviser, the liquid-
ity enhancer, and the credit enhancer. At times,
one commercial or investment bank would play
all three roles but, to avoid self-dealing and con-
flict of interest, the roles typically were played
by two or three separate banks. Seeking to
increase profits, some bank advisers brought to
market ABCP conduits without liquidity and
credit enhancers; instead, the advisers asserted
that the conduit would rely on its own “internal
liquidity” to satisfy all obligations (i.e., securities
arbitrage ABCP conduits). Maturing CP that is
not rolled over, for example, would be paid off
with cash flows generated either from the yields
on the assets themselves or by selling the assets
(Standard & Poor’s, 2008).16 Nationally recognized
statistical rating agencies generally accepted the
advisers’ assertions but required that such con-
duits maintain a “cushion” between their ABCP
outstanding and the market value of the securities
they hold. According to Standard & Poor’s (2008)
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16 These conduits are commonly referred to as securities arbitrage
ABCP conduits. Generally speaking, the structures of nonbank
investment vehicles, such as hedge funds, closely resemble each
other although the terminology differs. For hedge funds, the invest-
ment manager handles the portfolio choices, and usually is paid
based on performance; the administrator handles back-office tasks
including issuing and redeeming shares, calculating net asset value,
and measuring fund performance; the prime broker or custodian
handles clearing and settlement, money lending, and similar invest-
ment banking tasks. In some cases, the roles of administrator and
investment adviser are performed by the same firm.
15 Shares are calculated using data from the Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds table L.2; for example, the share of nonfinancial CP borrow-
ing is nonfinancial CP outstanding divided by nonfederal loans
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Census Bureau.over half of the conduits established between
2004 and 2007 relied, at least in part, on internal
liquidity. Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009)
present a theoretical model of market freezes in
which ABCP conduits take a structure very sim-
ilar to securities arbitrage conduits. The model
explains why markets, such as ABCP, that roll
over debt can experience sudden freezes.
THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
AND THE COMMERCIAL PAPER
MARKET
Financial crises often are defined by sharp
increases in the price of risk—that is, the premium
that investors require to purchase investments
that they previously bought at a much lower yield.
CP is a financial instrument particularly suscep-
tible to such an increase in risk premiums. What
is not clear, however, is the relative importance
of investors’ willingness to (i) bear risk and (ii)
endure a potential decrease in their liquidity.
Clearly, both affect CP market difficulties to some
degree. Holders of unsecured traditional CP may
suffer significant losses if the issuer fails; in
recession, the profit outlooks for most firms dim.
In addition, most issuers repay maturing paper
by rolling it over; if paper cannot be rolled over
and if the issuers’ banks do not extend credit to
pay the holders, repayment to the holders may
be delayed for a considerable period. Layered on
top was an increased fear that financial assets,
except for U.S. Treasuries, could not be resold to
other investors.
The CP market achieved national prominence
in the fall of 2008. Heightened financial market
uncertainty followed the failure of Lehman
Brothers on September 15. Investors and lenders,
uncertain of both the creditworthiness of coun-
terparties and their own ability to borrow in the
future (if necessary), shortened commitments and
shifted away from CP-based products toward
default risk-free assets, including MMMFs invested
solely in U.S. Treasuries. Borrowers argued that
a near closure of the market would sharply worsen
the recession. Suddenly, the term “shadow bank-
ing system” came into common usage.17
Market Events: 2007 and 2008
Difficulties in the CP market were apparent
during the fall of 2007. Issuance of ABCP, heavily
used by mortgage originators to bridge the financ-
ing gap between origination and securitization,
began to plummet. Mortgage lenders had backed
their paper with pools of home loans awaiting
securitization. Write-downs on mortgage-related
assets caused investors in ABCP to become wary
of the underlying assets. A small portion of ABCP
issuers (roughly 10 percent) exercised the option
allowing them to extend the maturity of their
borrowings, thereby cramming longer maturities
down to investors expecting repayment (Sahn-
Bubna, 2007). In addition, as the market value of
residential mortgage-backed securities fell, ABCP
conduits relying on internal liquidity began to fail
“cushion tests.” In some cases, conduits were
forced to sell securities—but into a fearful sec-
ondary market with few buyers. Between August
6 and 14, 2007, four conduits (representing 1.2
percent of the ABCP market) failed their cushion
tests and liquidated their portfolios (Standard &
Poor‘s, 2008). Between August 2007 and July 2008,
27 ABCP conduits with business plans that relied,
at least in part, on internal liquidity exited the
market (Moody’s, 2009). 
Figure 7 illustrates the boom and bust in the
ABCP market since 2001. Until 2005, the total
amount of CP outstanding was relatively stable.
Between early 2005 and the summer of 2007, the
amount outstanding doubled, reaching a peak of
$1.2 trillion in July 2007. As the ABCP market
collapsed, some conduits were unable to roll over
their paper, resulting in defaults (Keogh, 2007).
Investors became increasingly worried that banks,
which provided liquidity facilities to the conduits,
would be unable to support them (Mollenkamp,
2007). Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009) explain
how ABCP programs experienced a series of “runs”
between August and December 2007. Many runs
were directly linked to the credit and liquidity
exposures of individual programs. However, the
authors provide evidence that the ABCP market
was subject to a panic reminiscent of the banking
17 The term “shadow banking system” refers to those non-bank insti-
tutions, such as ABCP conduits, that provide funds to businesses.
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runs on some programs were not even related to
program fundamentals. Broad-based investor
concerns that sponsoring banks would be unable
to meet their commitments if numerous programs
required support at the same time caused exten-
sive withdrawals. Startled investors began to shift
their holdings from MMMFs invested in ABCP
toward MMMFs invested solely in Treasuries
(Figure 8).
Difficulties increased during 2008.18 CP out-
standing in December 2008 was $125 billion lower
than it was a year earlier, with ABCP paper
accounting for half that decrease ($64 billion).
At year-end 2008, the amount of outstanding
ABCP paper was approximately the same as at
year-end 2005. Because much of the intervening
increase in ABCP paper was mortgage related,
the decrease was not unexpected as the housing
market cooled. Moody’s (2009) reports that the
number of ABCP programs declined to 244 from
265, writing that the ABCP market “is returning
to one of primarily bank-sponsored multi-seller
programs, much as it was a decade ago.” Moody’s
(2009) reports taking rating actions (that is, reduc-
ing or reconsidering ratings) on seven ABCP pro-
grams during 2008; in all but one case, the action
reflected a weakening of an underlying support
party (that is, the liquidity or credit enhancer,
usually a bank). Advisers to ABCP conduits strug-
gled to sustain their outstanding issues; one ABCP
program defaulted because of decreases in the
prices of its assets. On occasion, advisers to ABCP
conduits shouldered the responsibility for offset-
ting asset losses: Nine program advisers declared
their intent to financially support their affiliated
ABCP programs. Many other advisers provided
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Figure 7
Average Monthly ABCP Issuance and Outstanding
NOTE: *Issuance is only AA rated.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Volume Statistics for Commercial Paper Issuance.
18 This section draws heavily on Moody’s Investors Service report,
“ABCP 2008 Year in Review and 2009 Outlook,” February 10, 2009.
For additional details see Fitch Ratings (2008a,b, 2009).support for individual assets or purchased assets
from the conduit to maintain the conduit’s credit
quality.
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on
September 15, 2008, was a major disruption to
the CP market. During the months prior to bank-
ruptcy, investors had faced a difficult choice:
Sell Lehman’s paper at a loss on the rumor of
failure, or wait and pray for the rescue of Lehman.
Lehman’s failure brought immediate stress on
the CP market. The following day, at 11 a.m., the
$62 billion Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck”
(that is, its net asset value fell below $0.995 per
nominal share) by writing its Lehman investments
(with face value of $785 million) down to 80 cents
per share; at 4 p.m., when it wrote the investments
down to zero, the fund’s net asset value per share
reportedly fell to 97 cents and the fund restricted
redemptions (Henriques, 2008). Prior to the
Reserve Fund actions, it had been 14 years since
investors in MMMFs had experienced a loss; in
that case, investors were paid 96 cents per share
at liquidation.
Investors in institution-type MMMFs, includ-
ing corporate cash managers, often use the funds
in a manner similar to bank deposits and with-
draw the funds on short notice. Losses, of course,
are undesired—but a suspension of redemptions
is intolerable. At that point, the issue became a
crisis of liquidity. Reacting to redemption restric-
tions, investors shifted more than $400 billion
from “prime” money funds (invested in CP and
other instruments) to money funds invested in
Treasuries. Shares in prime funds dropped from
$1.3 trillion on September 9 to $864 billion on
October 7, while government-only institution-
type funds increased by more than $350 billion
(Moody’s, 2009). The portfolio reallocation in
MMMFs is portrayed in Figure 8. In July 2007,
approximately 11 percent of MMMFs portfolios
were composed of government securities (i.e.,
Treasury bills); by January 2009, an average of
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SOURCE: Investment Company Institute.40 percent of a fund’s portfolio was made up of
government securities. At the same time, the
share of CP fell from roughly 32 percent to under
20 percent. Retail-type money funds, held pri-
marily by households but also by smaller busi-
nesses, were little affected. Quickly, however,
MMMFs that were invested in mortgage-related
assets came under pressure. Assistance came from
banks and fund managers—published reports said
more than $10 billion was pledged. Nevertheless,
the demand for CP fell. Issuance dropped, and
brokers and dealers were forced to retain elevated
inventories; at the end of 2008’s third quarter,
dealers held $154 billion of ABCP for sale, 78
percent more than a year earlier.19 It became
difficult to place ABCP for terms longer than
overnight; over  night issuance increased from
approximately 60 percent of the total to as much
as 90 percent. Federal Reserve Board data show,
however, that total issuance decreased little—
the effect of heightened uncertainty was reflected
in investors’ unwillingness to commit liquid funds
for more than one day at a time. Hence, the crisis
was primarily one of liquidity—“If I lend today
but need to borrow tomorrow, will anyone then
lend to me?”—rather than of heightened default
risk.
The degree of stress in the ABCP market is
reflected in short-term funding rates, all of which
increased sharply mid-September, both in absolute
level and relative to overnight federal funds
(Figure 9). In normal times, CP yields (especially
on ABCP) only slightly exceed those on compa-
rable Treasuries. Yet, two prominent spikes are
evident in the ABCP rate: late-August to early-
September 2007, when mortgage-related write-
downs began, and the most prominent in
September 2008. A large factor in the September
2008 spike was the scramble by CP issuers for funds
when MMMF demand for CP collapsed (Moody’s,
2009).
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Table H.15.Recent Treasury and Federal Reserve
Programs
Following mid-September 2008 market dis-
ruptions, the Treasury and Federal Reserve intro-
duced programs to enhance liquidity in two ways:
(i) by reducing extension risk, that is, the risk
that an investor will not repay maturing CP in a
timely fashion, either by rolling the paper or bank
borrowing; and (ii) by reducing the risk of sus-
pension of redemptions at MMMFs that hold CP.
The Treasury, in an effort to assure investors that
future suspension of redemptions would not
occur, offered insurance for the value of MMMF
shares held as of September 18 at funds choos-
ing to participate in its program.20 The Federal
Reserve introduced three programs with varied
objectives, including assuring money fund man-
agers that their CP could be sold quickly if nec-
essary and providing a funding facility that issuers
of highly rated paper could use as a backstop if
rollover failed.
The assets on the Fed’s balance sheet are
shown in Figure 10. In response to the financial
crisis the Fed created numerous lending programs,
causing its total assets to increase from under $1
trillion to over $2 trillion.21 The two dark-blue
areas represent the assets held by two programs
focused on the CP market: the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility (CPFF) and the Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Liquidity
Facility (AMLF). Roughly 15 percent of the Fed’s
assets were acquired through these programs. By
comparison, less than 1 percent of the Fed’s assets
were acquired from Bear Stearns or loans to
American International Group (AIG). We review
each of these programs below.
Money Market Investor Funding Facility.
This program was authorized by the Federal
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, H.4.1 Table 9.
21 See Gavin (2009) and Gascon (2009) for discussion of other Fed
lending programs and their impact on the Fed’s balance sheet.
20 See U.S. Department of the Treasury (2008) for additional details.Reserve Board on October 21, 2008, under the
provisions of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act.22 The Board describes the program as allow-
ing the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to
provide credit to “a series of special purpose
vehicles” established “by the private sector” to
purchase from eligible investors “certain highly
rated, short-term instruments, including certifi-
cates of deposit, bank notes, and CP.” Essentially,
the SPVs would be authorized to purchase bank
debt or CP forcibly sold into the market as a result
of a run on a bank or money fund. This program
had no activity and expired on October 30, 2009.
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility. Created
on September 19, 2008, the AMLF essentially
allows money market funds indirect access to the
Federal Reserve discount window via a deposi-
tory financial institution. The Federal Reserve
Board describes this facility as follows:
[AMLF] is a lending facility that provides fund-
ing to U.S. depository institutions and bank
holding companies to finance their purchases
of high-quality...ABCP from money market
mutual funds under certain conditions. The
program is intended to assist money funds
that hold such paper in meeting demands for
redemptions by investors and to foster liquidity
in the ABCP market and money markets more
generally.
Because money funds themselves are not eligible
to borrow at the discount window, to borrow under
AMLF they first must sell ABCP to an eligible
depository institution. Similar to other programs
that seek to assure investors that a suspension of
redemptions will not occur in the future, only
ABCP owned prior to the AMLF’s inception is
eligible. Assets of the AMLF initially expanded
rapidly, reaching a maximum of $152 billion in
its second week (the AMLF has the option to resell
the paper or hold it until maturity). Since that
time, the program’s assets have decreased at an
average weekly rate of 11 percent. In the week
ending April 1, 2009, the AMLF held just over
$6 billion in assets.
On June 25, 2009, the authorization of the
AMLF was extended through February 1, 2010,
although with additional administrative criteria
to ensure the program is used for its intended
purpose of a temporary liquidity backstop.
Commercial Paper Funding Facility. The
events of mid-September 2008 made money mar-
ket investors (who prize liquidity) hesitant to
purchase assets with maturities longer than a
single day. In normal times, approximately 5 to
10 percent of daily CP issuance is 91-day maturity,
and represents 20 to 25 percent of all outstanding
paper. In mid-September, 91-day issuance fell
to near zero. On Friday, September 12, for exam-
ple, 60 percent of issuance was 1- to 4-day matu-
rity; by Wednesday, September 17, 87 percent
was 1- to 4-day maturity. On October 7, 2008,
the Federal Reserve announced the creation of
the CPFF to support longer-maturity paper. The
CPFF’s structure is similar to the Money Market
Investor Funding Facility: An SPV purchases 3-
month corporate unsecured and asset-backed
A1/P1–rated CP using funds provided by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.23 The paper
is held to maturity. Similar to other CP market
support programs, the program is linked to the
events of mid-September 2008: The maximum
amount an issuer can sell to the CPFF is the maxi-
mum amount the issuer had outstanding between
January 1 and August 31, 2008, and the CPFF
will not purchase from issuers who were inactive
prior to its inception. The first purchases by the
CPFF occurred on October 27, 2008. It was origi-
nally scheduled to purchase paper through on
October 30, 2009, but was extended through
February 1, 2010, in order to ensure the access
of U.S. businesses to short-term funding. How  -
ever, the interest rates of the CPFF have become
increasingly unattractive to many borrowers.
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23 The details are more complex than summarized here. Technically,
the facility purchases newly issued paper with maturity of 81 days
or more. Pricing also is complex, with surcharges of 100 to 300
basis points. Each participating company must also pay a registra-
tion fee to use the CPFF. For details, see Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (2009b).
22 Section 13(3) allows the Federal Reserve Banks, under certain
conditions and with specified approval of the Board of Governors,
to lend to almost any borrower via the discounting of assets.
Section 13(3) does not permit direct lending; rather, the funding
is supplied via the borrower discounting assets to the Federal
Reserve. Hence, using a SPV as the borrower is convenient.The CPFF has been the most active of the
Federal Reserve’s three support programs for
the CP market and has been cited by Chairman
Bernanke (2009) and others as a highly success-
ful market support activity. Hence, its history is
worthy of closer examination.
Figure 11 shows the weekly issuance of 3-
month CP (rated A1/P1 and A2/P2), between
September 2008 and February 2009. Issuance
decreased sharply during September 2008, but
increased steadily during October. During its first
two weeks, the CPFF purchased the overwhelm-
ing majority of all newly issued eligible 3-month
CP. One likely reason for such large volume was
the wish by corporations to lock in year-end
financing; daily data show that issuance jumped
on October 27-29, the first days of purchase by the
CPFF. For all weeks thereafter—until the week of
January 28, 2009, when the initially purchased
91-day paper matured—relatively little CP was
purchased by the CPFF. The second burst of CPFF
activity occurred the weeks of January 28 and
February 4, when paper purchased by the CPFF
in October rolled over. Later weeks show light
activity. When the CPFF was in full swing, it held
over 20 percent of all CP outstanding, but fewer
and fewer investors continued to roll over their
paper with the CPFF; at the time of this writing,
the CPFF currently holds less than 5 percent of
all CP outstanding. The reason likely reflects a
pricing policy designed to urge private sector,
not CPFF, funding. Funding via the CPFF is not
inexpensive, with pricing set to yield 100 to 300
basis points above the overnight index swap rate.
Further, some former CPFF borrowers have turned
to the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which
guarantees bank debt at far longer maturities.
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CPFF Share of Purchases and Outstanding
SOURCE: FRB, H.4.1 Table 1; Federal Reserve Bank of New York.Figure 12 shows some historical perspective,
which compares, side by side, weekly issuance
in 2006-07, 2007-08, and 2008-09 of CP with
maturity greater than 80 days. The reduction in
CP issuance near year-end is quite pronounced.24
Although the period mid-September to mid-
October 2008 clearly is unusual, issuance appears
largely to have recovered by the time of the CPFF’s
first purchases. Was the CPFF necessary? Would
the market have recovered in the absence of the
CPFF? Or was the CPFF’s presence essential to
assure investors that a “purchaser of last resort,”
similar to the Federal Reserve’s discount window,
was available to mitigate rollover risk? It is too
early to say, as of this writing.
Finally, we note that the CPFF program has
been profitable for the Federal Reserve. According
to recently issued financial statements (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 2009a), between
October 14 and December 31, 2008, the program
had a net income of $1.08 billion and, as of
December 31, 2008, the program had experienced
no defaults.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF
COMMERCIAL PAPER
The CP market and MMMFs have matured
together, each complementing the other, and today
are the liquid core of the U.S. shadow banking
system. Money funds intermediate CP into liquid
shares that have many of the characteristics of
bank deposits; that is, the money funds provide
investors—large or small, retail or institutional—
a liquid, high-quality, low-risk investment alter-
native. Simultaneously, money funds purchase CP.
The CP market was originated by firms seek-
ing short-term funds at interest rates and terms
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Volume Statistics for Commercial Paper Issuance.more favorable than bank loans. The rise of bank-
advised, multiseller ABCP conduits during the
1990s extended the market’s purpose such that it
became focused on asset securitization and risk
diffusion, typically with significant off-balance-
sheet support from the nation’s largest commercial
banks. Today, the economic role of conduits is
similar to the role played by banks. Assets pur-
chased by conduits provide funds to businesses
small and large, while conduits’ bank advisers
seek to monitor the management and performance
of those assets’ issuers. Simultaneously, the CP
issued by conduits provides to investors a liquid,
low-risk asset. All of this occurs without the cost
and fuss of a banking charter, capital adequacy
requirements, or federal deposit insurance.
The rapid growth and large size of the CP
market sensitizes it to adverse events, including
the bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad in
1970 and, more recently, the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers. The sensitivity is twofold:
Issuers of secured paper find it increasingly diffi-
cult to roll over their paper, even at shorter matu-
rity and higher cost, and MMMFs and ABCP
programs may experience runs. The causes and
consequences of these two sensitivities require
further research.25 Policymakers will also find it
necessary to address if and how the regulations
will need to be implemented in what is now
understood to be a systematically important
sector of the U.S. and global economy.26 On the
other hand, in a low-interest-rate environment,
businesses may prefer to secure long-term financ-
ing and shift away from CP. To the extent that
financial markets currently expect low interest
rates to prevail for an extended period, volume
in the CP market may be attenuated for some time.
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